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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Revenge porn,” 1 otherwise known as the dissemination of 
nonconsensual pornography, is the sharing of images or videos that portray 
a person engaged in an intimate or sexually explicit act without that person’s 
consent.2 Although the term “revenge porn” would seem to only entail 
                                                           
ǂ JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2021. Winona Yang is a second-generation 
Hmong American woman born to political refugees and will be the first in her family to 
obtain a Juris Doctor. I thank my family for their tremendous support that allowed me to 
complete my legal studies and this Article. I thank my husband, Sieng Lee, and our children, 
Weston and Grant, for their patience as I pursued my education. Lastly, I thank Mitchell 
Hamline Law Review for its comments and contributions to this Article. This Article is 
dedicated to all victims of sexual assault and revenge porn.  
1 “Revenge porn” and “nonconsensual photography” will be used interchangeably in this 
Article. The term “revenge porn” has been criticized by scholars as an inaccurate term 
because the disseminated content is not limited to disseminators seeking revenge. Alisha 
Kinlaw, A Snapshot of Justice: Carving Out a Space for Revenge Porn Victims Within the 
Criminal Justice System, 91 TEMPLE L. REV. 407, 409 (2019). 
2 Mary A. Franks, Frequently Asked Questions, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/EEE2-A9F4] [hereinafter Franks, 
Frequently Asked Questions]. Apeksha Vora, Into the Shadows: Examining Judicial 
Language in Revenge Porn Cases, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 229 (2017) (“Revenge porn, 
more formally known as nonconsensual pornography, entails the dissemination of intimate 
and/or sexually explicit images of a person without his or her consent. The victim may have 
1
Yang: Minnesota Revenge Porn Law: A Look at the State v. Casillas Decis
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2021] MINNESOTA REVENGE PORN LAW 1217 
sexually explicit content distributed with reprisal, its scope encompasses a 
variety of personal content obtained with or without consent, such as 
intimate images or videos privately shared with another in the context of a 
relationship or unshared content obtained by hackers.3 
Unlike other sex or privacy crimes, “revenge porn perpetuates the 
violation by allowing the public to witness the crime, memorializing a 
traumatic experience in the victim’s life.”4 It is an act that rips away one’s 
agency.5 With the rise of internet technology and the use of social media, 
revenge porn is an ever-present threat to individuals that take record of their 
bodies. “One in [ten] former partners threaten to post sexually explicit 
images of their exes online, and an estimated [sixty] percent follow through,” 
and more than eighty percent of revenge porn content was recorded as 
“selfies.”6 In our society, in which seventy percent of Americans are active 
social media users,7 one in eight has been a victim of revenge porn.8 The 
“first ever nation-wide study to profile the rates of nonconsensual 
pornography victimization and perpetration” determined that women are 
1.7 times more likely than men to be victimized or threatened to have their 
content released,9 and other sources report that at least eighty percent of 
revenge porn victims are women.10 These women are most often within the 
age of fifteen to twenty-nine years old.11 Forty-seven percent of victims 
contemplate suicide after learning about the dissemination.12 Furthermore, 
revenge porn websites have recently multiplied in number, adding to the 
already large availability of pornographic sites that likewise allow users to 
                                                           
taken the photographs herself or the photographs may have been taken, either with or 
without the victim’s consent, by the eventual poster.”). 
3 Franks, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2. 
4 Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 411. 
5 Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 309 (2005) (defining “agency” 
as “the power of persons, at the individual or collective levels, to develop and achieve creative 
goals, including social and political change, within their social environment”). 
6 Amanda Levendowski, Our Best Weapon Against Revenge Porn: Copyright Law?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/02/our-best-
weapon-against-revenge-porn-copyright-law/283564/ [https://perma.cc/XU7E-YUQH]. 
7 Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/L4M4-8U6Z]. 
8 Id. 
9 ASIA A. EATON, HOLLY JACOBS & YANET RUVALCABA, 2017 NATIONWIDE ONLINE STUDY 
OF NONCONSENSUAL PORN VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION: A SUMMARY REPORT 4, 
12 (2017). 
10 Levendowski, supra note 6. 
11 AMANDA LENHART, MICHELE YBARRA & MYESHIA PRICE-FEENEY, NONCONSENSUAL 
IMAGE SHARING: ONE IN 25 AMERICANS HAS BEEN A VICTIM OF “REVENGE PORN” 5 (2016). 
12 Cynthia Barmore, Criminalization in Context: Involuntariness, Obscenity, and the First 
Amendment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 447, 449 (2015). 
2
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post and reproduce the content.13 Whether the private content is 
disseminated by text message, e-mail, on a social media platform, or on a 
site tailored specifically for revenge porn, the perpetrators often publish the 
victim’s personal information such as her name, address, social media 
profiles, and employer’s information.14 
Despite these findings, federal and state judicial and legislative 
systems have remained stagnant in creating laws that help revenge porn 
victims find recourse. As discussed in further detail below, Congress has yet 
to pass any federal law that protects victims of revenge porn.15 Although 
forty-five states have passed revenge porn laws to date,16 many such laws are 
too narrow or too broad in breadth, allowing perpetrators to circumvent 
them or challenge their constitutional validity.17 Furthermore, only eleven 
                                                           
13 Lorelei Laird, Victims Are Taking on ‘Revenge Porn’ Websites for Posting Photos They 
Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2013), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/victims_websites_photos_consent 
[https://perma.cc/T7WB-7U3Z]. 
14 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014). 
15 At the time this Article was written, there was no federal law criminalizing the 
nonconsensual dissemination of sexually explicit or intimate images. In 2017, the “Ending 
Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017” (also known as the 
“ENOUGH Act”) was introduced in the Senate. The bill “amends the federal criminal code 
to make it a crime to knowingly distribute (or intentionally threaten to distribute) an intimate 
visual depiction of an individual with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the individual’s 
lack of consent, reasonable expectation of privacy, and potential harm; and without a 
reasonable belief that such distribution touches a matter of public concern.” S. 2162, 115th 
Cong. (2017). However, this legislation is yet to pass. See id. § 1 (as reported by S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, November 28, 2017). 
16 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVES, 
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/EFT9-PFB2]. Note 
that this source does not take into consideration that section 617.261 of the Minnesota 
Statutes has been invalidated by the court, nor does it have updated data as to whether any 
other states have invalidated their revenge porn statutes as well. 
17 Although California’s original 2013 revenge porn proposal was drafted to be much more 
inclusive, the language of the final bill was so narrow that it was deemed ineffective by victims 
and advocates because it only punished people for distributing pictures “that they themselves 
had taken of the victim.” Jessica Roy, California’s New Anti-Revenge Porn Bill Won’t Protect 
Most Victims, TIME (Oct. 3, 2013), https://nation.time.com/2013/10/03/californias-new-
anti-revenge-porn-bill-wont-protect-most-victims/ [https://perma.cc/G7A6-DBYA]; CAL. 
PENAL STAT. § 647(j)(4) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 17 of 2021 Reg. Sess.). The statutory 
language has been updated substantially since then and now includes distribution—personally 
or via a third party—and expands the types of images included. CAL. PENAL STAT. § 647(j)(4) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 17 of 2021 Reg. Sess.). Arizona’s original 2014 statute was 
overly broad and did not require any intent by the distributor to cause emotional harm. 
Barmore, supra note 12, at 452 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (West, Westlaw 
through April 20, 2021)) (“It is unlawful to intentionally . . . distribute . . . [an image] of 
another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific sexual activities if the person knows 
or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure.”). 
However, the law has since been amended to include an intent element—making it more 
3
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states provide civil remedies for victims of revenge porn.18 On the one hand, 
the increasing number of state legislatures that enact revenge porn statutes 
is telling of the severity of the issue and the dire need for a federal law. On 
the other hand, even where laws that seem to protect victims exist, victims 
may face gender bias in the courtrooms, a bias of which is often injected 
directly into a judicial opinion’s interpretation of a statute’s language. 
In this Article, I seek to create urgency around the need for effective 
revenge porn laws to protect our increasingly vulnerable society. In Part II, 
I discuss the existing alternative legal frameworks that victims may pursue 
where revenge porn laws do not exist or have otherwise been held 
unconstitutional. I shed light on the shadow taxonomy that pervades the 
judicial language of the very few revenge porn cases that have been litigated 
vigorously enough for courts to produce opinions. I also explore the history 
of revenge porn laws in Minnesota with specific reference to Minnesota 
Statutes section 617.261. In Parts III and IV, I discuss the First Amendment 
as it applies to the State v. Casillas19 decisions. Specifically, in Part III, I 
summarize the Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in which the court 
overturned the respondent’s conviction under section 617.261 under the 
overbreadth doctrine. In Part IV, I analyze the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
reversal of the court of appeals’ holding under the strict-scrutiny analysis. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Existing Legal Frameworks 
Scholars disagree as to what the best routes of recourse for 
revenge porn victims are. Some scholars suggest that victims should seek 
legal recourse, while others suggest that commercial solutions, such as 
obtaining the services of online reputation management firms, is the more 
practical route.20 This Section will briefly discuss the existing legal 
frameworks available to victims of revenge porn in copyright law, tort law, 
or criminal statutes.  
With regard to copyright law, the Copyright Act grants 
constitutionally-guaranteed copyright protections under federal law to 
                                                           
narrowly tailored. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1425(A) (West, Westlaw through April 20, 
2021) (“The image is disclosed with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce 
the depicted person.”). 
18 Phillip Takhar, A Proposal for a Notice-and-Takedown Process for Revenge Porn, HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. DIG. (2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-proposal-for-a-notice-and-
takedown-process-for-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/27ZS-QC76]. 
19 938 N.W.2d 74, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019); 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020). 
20 Vora, supra note 2, at 233. 
4
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authors that create original work, including photographs and videos.21 
Victims may bring copyright infringement claims against their perpetrator in 
civil court.22 However, typically only victims who took their own picture or 
video have standing to bring forth copyright infringement claims.23 
Shockingly, “[t]o obtain copyright privileges necessary to enable a copyright 
infringement claim against a website in instances where the images were 
taken with consent by another person other than the victim, the victim must 
copyright the exposed parts of her body by registering it with the 
government.”24 This route requires the victim to voluntarily expose the most 
intimate parts of her body to the government in order for the government 
to be equipped to protect her.25 Without undergoing this arduous process, 
some websites will continue to host the content online, as they are very likely 
protected by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).26 
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), victims 
may bring copyright infringement claims against service providers that host 
their photographs or videos in order to obtain injunctive relief.27 However, 
once the service provider removes the content, it is immune from liability, 
even when other service providers or viewers have saved or reproduced the 
content.28 Furthermore, victims face additional nuanced issues in bringing 
forth copyright infringement claims: (1) the victim is likely unable to stop 
further reproduction of their content, (2) it would be costly to pursue 
multiple cases against other individuals or service providers that shared the 
content, and (3) the victim cannot stop their content from being archived on 
                                                           
21 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(5) (2012); Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“Copyright in a work protected 
under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”). Samantha H. Scheller, 
A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Words: The Legal Implications of Revenge Porn, 93 N.C. 
L. REV. 551, 583 (2015). 
22 Scheller, supra note 21, at 583. 
23 Id. Victims who were photographed or filmed by another typically would not be able to 
bring forth copyright infringement claims against that person because ownership of the 
content only extends to the person who took the photo or video. Id. 




26 Although the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images and videos is not 
recognized as an exception under section 230, this law does not apply to: (1) federal criminal 
laws, (2) intellectual property laws, (3) laws “consistent with” section 230; the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, and (5) laws that prohibit sex trafficking. VALERIE C. 
BRANNON, LIABILITY FOR CONTENT HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION 
DECENCY ACT’S SECTION 230, at 3 (2019). 
27 Vora, supra note 2, at 233–34. 
28 Id. 
5
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the Internet. Realistically, the most the victim may do is regularly check to 
see if the images or videos appear on websites, and then individually request 
those websites to remove the content.29 Without question, this constant 
monitoring can very quickly become costly and futile as it repeatedly 
traumatizes victims into perpetual states of shame and paranoia. 
With regard to tort law, victims may pursue various tort claims 
against their perpetrators, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress 
(“IIED”),30 public disclosure of private facts,31 defamation,32 false light,33 and 
intrusion upon seclusion.34 Although victims may be successful in their tort 
claims, these claims typically have many limitations. For example, 
oftentimes, the victim must be able to identify the perpetrator.35 However, 
this is not always the case—perpetrators may use pseudonyms to hide their 
identities or their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.36 Without the ability to 
immediately identify the poster or posters to bring claims, the victim may 
have to collect identifying information.37 Where such information is 
                                                           
29 Id. at 234–35.  
30 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 303, at 826 (2000). To prove IIED, a victim must 
show that there was (1) an intentional or reckless act (2) that is extreme and outrageous and 
(3) causes severe emotional distress. See Scheller, supra note 21, at 581–82 (explaining the 
elements of IIED). 
31 Scheller, supra note 21, at 578. Public disclosure of private facts requires a public disclosure 
of private facts that are “highly offensive to a reasonable person (an objective standard) and 
that the subject matter must not be of legitimate public concern.” Id. The victim must show 
that there was public disclosure, that the private facts or content were true and not a part of 
a public record, that the dissemination would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 
that the public would not have a significant interest in the content. Id. at 579. 
32 Id. at 569. Under a defamation claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant caused 
actual damages resulting from the publication of defamatory statements about the plaintiff. 
If there is no falsity at issue, then there is no defamation claim. Id. Furthermore, plaintiffs 
must show that the dissemination of the sexual content included an injurious false 
communication. See Taylor v. Franko, No. CIV. 09-00002 JMS, 2011 WL 2746714, at *1 
(D. Haw. July 12, 2011) (holding defendant liable for defamation, among other rights of 
action, for posting sexual images of plaintiff with her contact information, claiming that she 
was interested in a “visit or phone call”).   
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. L. INST. 1977) (stating that one may be 
liable to another under if “(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless 
disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would 
be placed.”). 
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“One who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private 
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”). 
35 Vora, supra note 2, at 240. 
36 Id. 
37 Robert G. Larson & Paul A. Godfread, Bringing John Doe to Court: Procedural Issues in 
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Defendants, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 328, 329–30 
(2011). 
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available—as it is possible that internet users are able to maintain untraceable 
anonymity—victims may use that information to name defendants 
“pseudonymously” and then work to obtain more identifying information 
through an expedited discovery stage.38 These measures usually require the 
victim to seek professional investigation services. 
Yet, even where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator, 
the ability to pursue civil cases is mostly reserved for plaintiffs who have trust 
in the judicial system and access to the financial means to use it.39 Thus, 
because tort claims fall within the realm of civil litigation, the pursuit of a 
tort claim arguably is practical only for middle- and upper-class White 
victims because low-income victims or victims of color may not have the 
economic and legal resources to pursue civil cases or may not trust the 
United States court systems.40 Furthermore, even in instances where a victim 
does have the means to both identify and sue the perpetrator, a successful 
holding in favor of the victim’s claim may still be insufficient because the 
defendant may not have the financial means to pay damages.41 
Disseminating revenge porn is as easy as pressing “send,” and anyone with 
the intention to do so can, regardless of their class, social status, and inability 
to pay the repercussions. 
With regard to criminal statutes, there is no federal law that 
criminalizes the dissemination of private sexual content.42 Within the realm 
of Congress’s powers to enact law, Congress may only regulate: (1) the use 
of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) the instrumentalities, persons or 
things in interstate commerce, and (3) activities having a substantial relation 
to interstate commerce.43 Although victims and prosecutors may try to seek 
                                                           
38 Id. at 338. 
39 Id. at 339–41 (“In practice, first, the plaintiff sues a fictitious ‘John Doe.’ The plaintiff then 
obtains the court’s permission to subpoena identifying information from the relevant OSPs 
[online service providers]. Once the plaintiff obtains such information from the OSPs, the 
plaintiff amends the complaint to name the person identified by the OSPs. . . . [I]t appears 
that courts are generally willing to allow the plaintiff to proceed with expedited discovery so 
as to uncover the identity of the would-be defendant.”). 
40 Sara S. Greene, Race, Class, and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1288–89 
(2016) (explaining that inaction to pursue civil cases was due to (1) past experiences and 
perceptions of the criminal and civil justice systems discouraged trust of the civil system; (2) 
belief that the judicial system was unfair and tended to favor the party that had “money to 
pay for an expensive lawyer;” (3) negative experiences with the courts and other public 
institutions caused for negative feelings about the legal system; and (4) respondents’ self-
sufficiency beliefs that they could handle their own problems without reliance of the judicial 
system). Moreover, Black people are more likely than White people to believe that the 
judicial system is corrupted. Id. at 1307. 
41 Vora, supra note 2, at 237–38. 
42 State Revenge Porn Policy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/revenge-
porn/ [https://perma.cc/6XH3-LJKS] (“[F]ederal law does not provide a remedy to victims 
of nonconsensual pornography . . . .”). 
43 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  
7
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justice through other federal laws,44 Congress has not recognized 
nonconsensual pornography or its “disclosure” as a category of interstate 
commerce. Yet, one could argue that revenge porn content should be 
regulated as interstate commerce due to a general consensus among states 
that the contents of revenge porn are tangible, that the dissemination needs 
to be regulated, and that the content and nature of its dissemination crosses 
state lines through the Internet.45 
In 2017, Vice President Kamala Harris, in her role then as a 
United States Senator, introduced to Congress the “Ending Nonconsensual 
Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017,” otherwise known as the 
ENOUGH Act.46 The bill, which was drafted to fit within Congress’s 
commerce powers, made it “unlawful to knowingly distribute a private, 
visual depiction of an individual’s intimate parts or of an individual engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless disregard for the individual’s lack 
of consent to the distribution, and for other purposes.”47 However, Congress 
did not enact the bill.48 Thus, we have yet to see a federal law emerge that 
successfully expands, or perhaps a case that effectively challenges, the scope 
of interstate commerce to include the dissemination of nonconsensual 
pornography.49 
In absence of a federal law, victims must rely on their state 
legislatures to pass or create these protections. Revenge porn laws vary from 
state to state, as there is no general consensus standardizing the definition 
of the crime or selection of statutory language. For example, state 
legislatures have failed to pass proposed bills addressing nonconsensual 
dissemination of sexual images or videos in Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, 
Kentucky, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington.50 Many of the state 
statutes that were indeed passed may not withstand judicial scrutiny and may 
need to undergo legislative reconstruction.51 Furthermore, in consideration 
                                                           
44 Mary Anne Franks, Combating Non-Consensual Pornography: A Working Paper 5–7 
(Sept. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Franks, 
Combating] (discussing potentiality and limitations of existing federal laws that prosecutors 
and victims may rely upon, those being the federal laws regarding sexual exploitation and 
abuse of children, the Interstate Anti-Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, the Video 
Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act). 
45 Id. at 11 (stating that information transmitted through the Internet qualifies as “interstate 
commerce” and is within the powers of Congress to regulate). 
46 ENOUGH Act, S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017). 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
49 See Franks, Combating, supra note 44, at 11. 
50 Barmore, supra note 12, at 455–56. 
51 See MINN. STAT. § 617.261 (2016) (struck down by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 
2019). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16 (West, Westlaw through end of 2019 Reg. Sess. 
86th Leg.) (passed in 2015 and reformed by Texas legislature in 2019 to include “intent to 
harm”). 
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of the First Amendment, these criminal statutes are often too narrow to 
apply to all cases of revenge porn or too broad, both of which give rise to 
issues of constitutionality and prompt courts to strike them down.52  
Arkansas’s revenge porn statute is an example of an overly narrow 
law.53 It protects only victims whose perpetrator was a family member, a 
member of the victim’s household, or a person with whom the victim is 
currently or formerly in a dating relationship with.54 Thus, under this law, 
victims in Arkansas have no recourse against a perpetrator who does not fit 
into these strict categories, leaving victims unprotected in the context of 
subsequent dissemination, such as reproduction of the content that takes 
place online, through the mail, or through text message. 
Criminal statutes today lack a solution for victims whose content 
has been posted on wider mediums, such as social media platforms, 
pornography websites, and other service providers.55 Critics argue that 
although criminal liability may act as a deterrent, it does not provide victims 
with complete justice.56 Even though victims may see their perpetrators 
successfully prosecuted under the law and be entitled to monetary damages, 
these laws do not seek to remove the images from the Internet, nor do they 
protect victims from future social and mental harm caused by the further 
dissemination of their private content from other posters.57 These critics 
argue that federal and state laws need to “provide more robust remedies” 
that include: (1) a private right of action against anyone who posts the private 
content without consent regardless of whether the person created the image 
and (2) an injunction against any website that hosts the content.58 With that 
said, an injunction of this caliber may be difficult, if not impossible, for state 
legislatures, as websites and service providers are generally protected by 
immunity under section 230 of the federal Communications Decency Act 
(CDA).59 
                                                           
52 State Revenge Porn Policy, supra note 42 (“The purpose of state revenge porn laws should 
be to protect victims from harassment and abuse as well as the ongoing harms that result 
from distribution of nonconsensual pornography. But some of the state laws include 
provisions do not help victims and, in some cases, could make things worse.”). 
53 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314 (West, Westlaw through April 15, 2021). 
54 Id. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4 (West, Westlaw through March 25, 2021) 
(limiting nonconsensual pornography to only photographs and videos that were taken 
without consent). 
55 State Revenge Porn Policy, supra note 42. 
56 Id. (“Criminal liability for the perpetrator, while important, is not enough. While criminal 
liability may have a deterrent effect, victims face ongoing harm from the dissemination and 
access to their images without consent. This harm can be more effectively remedied by 
removing the nonconsensual pornographic material.”). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
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State statutes that criminalize revenge porn must be carefully 
written because they cannot supersede federal law. Section 230 “provides 
interactive computer services with immunity [because] the interactive 
computer services are not considered publishers of the content their users 
post.”60 This legislation protects websites and service providers in both tort 
and criminal proceedings even when the websites are the very source that 
enables the content to be continuously shared and reproduced.61 They are 
essentially untouchable in terms of liability, with exclusion to violations of 
child pornography, obscenity, criminal, or intellectual property laws.62 
Where victims consented to the image or video being taken but did not 
consent to the upload, section 230 offers no remedy beyond a safe harbor 
exception in which the victim must produce a copyright infringement 
claim.63 This may be an effective route for most revenge porn victims 
because, as stated, eighty percent of revenge porn content are “selfies.” Yet, 
again, only individuals who took their own photos or videos of their bodies 
are considered “original creators,” which is necessary to make a copyright 
claim to the content, resulting in a large demographic of revenge porn 
victims being precluded from this legal remedy.64  
Furthermore, courts rarely hold these websites and service 
providers liable for their involvement in the perpetuation of revenge porn 
content and instead often uphold the immunity privileges provided to these 
companies. In Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, a case in which an actress sued 
Matchmaker.com for a profile created of her by an unknown person, the 
court held that the website had no liability because it “did not play a 
significant role in creating, developing, or ‘transforming’ the relevant 
information.”65 The court reasoned that Congress’s intent in granting service 
providers immunity under section 230 was to “promote the free exchange 
of information and ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary 
monitoring for offensive or obscene material.”66  
In GoDaddy.com v. Toups, victims brought suit against 
GoDaddy, an interactive computer service provider that hosted two revenge 
porn websites where the victims’ photos were posted.67 The Texas Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling against GoDaddy.com.68 The 
                                                           
60 Vora, supra note 2, at 238. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (“No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”). 
61 Vora, supra note 2, at 238. 
62 Levendowski, supra note 6. 
63 Id. 
64 See Section II.A. 
65 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). 
66 Id. at 1122. 
67 See generally GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014). 
68 Id. at 753. 
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court ruled that GoDaddy.com was not liable because of congressional 
intent for the CDA to have a broad application of immunity69 and because 
the CDA is not limited to constitutionally-protected material.70 With this 
said, victims are highly unlikely to find resolution against the websites that 
host such content as long as the content was posted by a third party. 
In line with the existing legal frameworks, victims may seek the 
alternative route of employing extralegal commercial remedies. For 
example, online reputation management firms use search engine 
optimization to “push[] positive content and information about an 
individual towards the first page of search results,” which simultaneously 
pushes the negative material, such as site locations, deeper into the search 
query.71 By doing so, although the firms lack the ability to remove the 
content, the firms help the victims better control their reputations by 
decreasing the likelihood that such content would be found.72  
Yet, commercial remedies are not accessible to all victims because 
these services are expensive and often need to be employed over long 
periods of time.73 Online reputation management firms may charge 
anywhere from $100 to $100,000.74 For example, one such firm, 
Reputation-Defender, charges anywhere between $3,000 to $15,000 for its 
services.75 Costs may become excessively steep because victims will require 
ongoing monitoring and search engine optimization to prevent the content 
from being easily discoverable.76 This route, like that of civil suits, is 
primarily reserved for victims who have the financial means to pursue it. 
In conclusion, criminal statutes and civil remedies that are 
applicable or related to revenge porn laws at best and when constitutional, 
still fail to address all the systemic and nuanced parts of victim suffering.77 
For example, “stalking and harassment laws are not applicable to revenge 
porn submitters because there is no repeated course of conduct or direct 
communication with the victim.”78 Criminal statutes must be enacted to 
provide victims appropriate remedies, particularly because many victims 
lack the financial and legal means to pursue civil cases against their 
perpetrators. Even for those victims who can afford to pursue such civil 
                                                           
69 Id. at 759. 
70 Id. 
71 Vora, supra note 2, at 241. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See generally Joseph Torrillo, Online Reputation Management Cost & Pricing Explained, 
REPUTATIONMANAGEMENT.COM (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.reputationmanagement.com/ 
blog/reputation-management-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/FFT2-XEVG]. 
75 Vora, supra note 2, at 241. 
76 Id. 
77 Barmore, supra note 12, at 456. 
78 Levendowski, supra note 6. 
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claims, a successful ruling in their favor does not guarantee protection from 
future harm, as the laws do not specifically prevent the subsequent 
dissemination of the harmful content. Neither does a favorable ruling 
guarantee paid damages. Lastly, a victim risks “unleashing more unwanted 
publicity” merely by attaching their real name to a suit.79 
B. The Shadow Taxonomy of Judicial Language 
Notwithstanding the fact that very few revenge porn cases are 
litigated to the extent that judicial opinions are written, several courts that 
have produced opinions ruled in favor of defendants. Critics argue that 
victims are undermined in the courts by a “shadow taxonomy.” Scholars 
define “shadow taxonomy” as judicial language within court opinions that 
“reveal the underlying power dynamics [that] ultimately reveal that the 
shadow taxonomy works to trivialize the very harms for which the 
established legal framework purports to offer remedy.”80 These insidious 
subtleties folded within judicial language illustrate how courts acknowledge 
the harms suffered by victims but have the unnerving tendencies to support 
the defendants.81 
An analysis of judicial language depicts the existence of a shadow 
taxonomy and how it minimizes and disregards the harm suffered by 
revenge porn victims.82 As scholars have argued, “[w]ithout addressing the 
actual harms the plaintiff-victims experienced in this case, the court 
effectively wipes those harms away from existence. Thus, the court is 
perpetuating a discourse in which women’s harms are trivialized.”83 In 
addition to silencing victim suffering, judicial language typically does not 
recognize or acknowledge the “amplification effect,” otherwise known as the 
repeated and potentially exponential dissemination of the victim’s content 
by derivative posters.84 The court’s disregard may be due to the protections 
provided by section 230, but the court’s failure to acknowledge how websites 
                                                           
79 Citron & Franks, supra note 14, at 358. Victims may also hide their identity under the guise 
of a pseudonym. Id. 
80 Vora, supra note 2, at 243. 
81 Id. 
82 See People v. Barber, 42 Misc. 3d 1225(A), *1–8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb 18, 2014) (making 
no mention of any harms suffered by the victim as a result of the defendant posting her nude 
photos to his Twitter account). See also GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 
753 (Tex. App. 2014) (mentioning only harms suffered by the victim coincidentally while 
listing the plaintiff’s alleged tort claims without any additional description of harm). 
83 Vora, supra note 2, at 231, 246 (“As the amplification effect occurs, the amount of viewers 
of the initial revenge porn post increases exponentially. However, as the amount of viewers 
increases, so decreases the likelihood that the victim can: (1) locate all of her photos on the 
Internet and (2) identify all of the subsequent reposters.”). 
84 See GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d at 753 (court does not mention the harmful effects caused 
by the revenge porn websites hosting of the victims’ images and videos). 
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perpetuate such harms is a continued act of silencing.85 “The silencing of 
these harms works to both erase them from precedent, and from memory, 
and simultaneously perpetuates the notion that website intermediaries are 
not responsible for the behavior of subsequent reposters (or other content 
providers), even though it is the intermediary’s platform that sustains such 
harassment.”86 
When the amplification effect is indeed mentioned, courts merely 
mention it as background information, often in the context of factual 
information or the footnotes of an opinion.87 Courts have also employed 
specific verbiage that diminishes the seriousness of victims’ experiences. For 
example, in People v. Barber, “the court uses trivializing words at least eight 
times––an average of once per page,” by attaching the words “mere,” 
“simply,” and “only” when describing the defendant’s conduct of posting 
the victim’s private sexual images on his Twitter account.88 In doing so, 
victims are ultimately denied full justice and protection of the law because 
the harms that stem directly from the reproduction of the private content 
are made inconsequential. 
To conclude, these opinions either fail to fully grasp the severity 
of the defendants’ conduct, nor the harms that victims experienced, 
resulting in the courts, again, ultimately silencing the victims.89 To remedy 
this, feminist scholars have argued that courts would have “more compelling 
argument[s]” against defendants where the harms suffered by the victims are 
included in the analyses.90 However, since the court’s acts are also deeply 
rooted in society’s treatment and portrayal of women,91 the courts must 
approach revenge porn cases with an especially critical eye. 
III. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Under the First Amendment, Congress may not pass a law that 
prohibits the free exercise of speech or abridges the freedom of speech.92 
                                                           
85 Vora, supra note 2, at 246. 
86 Id.  
87 See id. at 247; Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 158–69 (Tex. App. 2016) (the court 
dedicates ten pages to discussing the defendant’s threatening language to victim, but it is 
presented as background information and not within the analysis itself). 
88 Vora, supra note 2, at 248; People v. Barber, 42 Misc. 3d 1225(A), *2–8 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Feb 18, 2014). 
89 See Vora, supra note 2, at 246 (“[R]efusing to name or identify someone or something 
through language is to silence it, wipe it, and censor it from existence; the practice of silencing 
is ‘part and parcel of the veiling process that accompanies the wielding of power.’”). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
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However, the Court “reject[s] the view that freedom of speech and 
association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are 
absolutes.”93 Although there is no dominant theory as to how the First 
Amendment should be interpreted, the four main theories are that freedom 
of speech “is protected to further self-governance, to aid the discovery of 
truth via the marketplace of ideas, to promote autonomy, and to foster 
tolerance.”94 The theory of advancing autonomy underscores one’s 
personhood, free will, and self-governance.95 However, critics have argued 
that this theory “ignores the ways in which protecting freedom of speech for 
some can undermine the autonomy and self-fulfillment of others,” 96 such as 
hate speech and racial epithets,97 or in our case, revenge porn. 
A. The Strict Scrutiny Standard 
In order to conduct a First Amendment analysis, courts look to 
whether the law in question is content-based or content-neutral.98 A 
“content-based” restriction is one that regulates speech based on its content, 
viewpoint, or subject matter99 or if the application of the law depends on 
such.100 Content-based laws are presumed to be unconstitutional and must 
survive strict scrutiny to be upheld.101 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the 
                                                           
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
93 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961). 
94 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1238 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed. 
2017) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]. 
95 Id. at 1241. 
96 Id. 
97 John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539, 543 (2006) 
(arguing that hate speech should be proscribed). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 380 (1992) (invalidating a statute that barred using a symbol, objection, appellation, 
characterization, or graffiti to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment in others based on race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender). 
98 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1242 (stating courts find this 
distinction is “crucial” in determining which judicial scrutiny is applicable). See, e.g., Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 865 (1991) (providing an 
example of content-neutral laws, in which “a prohibition against sound trucks in residential 
neighborhoods during the nighttime hours would be supported by interests unrelated to the 
message communicated and would therefore be tested under a much less stringent test than 
would a content-based regulation.”). 
99 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding a restriction is content-
based if it was “adopted . . . because of disagreement with the message [the speech] 
conveys.”). 
100 Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000) [hereinafter 
Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality]. 
101 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1244. The Supreme Court has 
ruled that “above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
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restriction “may be justified only if the government proves that [it is] 
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”102 “Narrowly tailored” 
requires that the statute be the “least restrictive means” necessary to carry 
out the government’s compelling interests, although the means used are not 
required to be perfectly tailored.103 The state interest must be an “actual 
problem” that requires solution.104 The Court has acknowledged that 
content-based restrictions may allow the government to “effectively drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”105 
However, a content-neutral law is impartial both in terms of the 
subject matter and the viewpoint.106 “Content-neutral” laws may be deemed 
constitutional where the law is justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech.107 A law is “justified” if it falls within “the constitutional 
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is not greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest.”108 If the law is content-neutral, courts must apply 
intermediate scrutiny.109 Any law may violate the First Amendment without 
undergoing judicial scrutiny if the law is unduly vague or overbroad.110 
B. The Overbreadth Doctrine 
Laws that regulate speech may be invalidated under the vagueness 
and overbreadth doctrines111 unless they can be cured or partially severed.112 
These doctrines are unique because defendants can challenge the law’s 
constitutionality even if the defendant’s own incriminating speech was not 
                                                           
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content,” and that 
“[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.” Id. See also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. 
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382. 
102 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). 
103 United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000). 
104 Id. at 822. 
105 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
116 (1991). 
106 Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 100, at 50. 
107 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
108 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
109 Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality, supra note 100, at 55 (“In Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, the Court said that the general rule is that content-based restrictions on speech 
must meet strict scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations only need meet intermediate 
scrutiny.”). 
110 Id. 
111 The Supreme Court has not made a clear distinction between vagueness and overbreadth. 
See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of 
Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
112 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1283. 
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of a category protected by the First Amendment.113 With regard to the 
overbreadth doctrine, it is generally reserved only for laws that target speech, 
including both “pure” speech and expressive conduct, and it may otherwise 
not be used for laws that do not pertain to the First Amendment.114 A law is 
overbroad, and thus unconstitutional, “if it regulates substantially more 
speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated, and a person to whom 
the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it would be 
unconstitutional as applied to others.”115 
The overbreadth doctrine considers two important aspects. First, 
a law must be substantially overbroad, meaning that the law must restrict a 
significant amount of protected speech when judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.116 Although there is no exact definition as 
to what accounts as “substantially overbroad,”117 the Court has stated that 
“there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly 
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before 
the Court.”118 However, if courts find that the law fails to meet this threshold 
of substantially overbroad in that the law does not restrict significant 
amounts of protected speech, then the law will not be deemed overbroad 
and will stand.119 Second, a person to whom the law may be constitutionally 
applied can validly argue that the law would be unconstitutional as applied 
to others because it would infringe upon their rights to speech.120 The 
overbreadth doctrine essentially allows defendants to shift “the focus of the 
litigation from the alleged criminal to the law itself . . . from the actual 
                                                           
113 Id. See infra Section III.C. 
114 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (stating the Court has “recognized an 
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment”). 
115 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1285. 
116 Id. at 1286. 
117 Id. at 1287. 
118 Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 
(1984). 
119 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1287; see generally Virginia v. 
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003). 
120 CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 94, at 1287. The overbreadth 
challenge is an exception to the general standing rule that “a statute may constitutionally be 
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be 
applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973); see Fallon, supra note 98, at 865 (“[T]he First 
Amendment enjoys a special status in the constitutional scheme. Any substantial ‘chilling’ of 
constitutionally protected expression is intolerable. Third-party rights are too important to 
go unprotected, and there may often be no better challenger than the one before the court. 
‘Facial’ attacks on and invalidations of overbroad statutes are therefore permitted in this area 
of the law.”). 
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conduct of the defendant to the hypothetical conduct of others.”121 Because 
this second prong allows a convicted person to overturn the conviction by 
successfully bringing forth the overbreadth doctrine, it should only be used 
as a last resort.122 
C. Which to Apply? 
Although the Supreme Court has never explained in-depth the 
relationship between the overbreadth doctrine and the strict scrutiny 
doctrine, the two are separate modes of analysis.123 Thus, there is no 
standard rule as to when a court must apply one over the other, which results 
in redundancy when courts apply both or in confusion when different courts 
apply different modes of analysis to reach opposite results.124 Because courts 
review constitutional challenges de novo, courts are not required to apply 
the lower court’s analysis of the law. 
As discussed below, the Minnesota Court of Appeals used the 
overbreadth doctrine to analyze the constitutionality of section 617.261 of 
the Minnesota Statutes, the revenge porn statute that the defendant was 
convicted under and then challenged, in State v. Casillas.125 The court ruled 
in favor of the defendant and deemed the statute unconstitutional under the 
overbreadth doctrine, ultimately invalidating the statute altogether.126 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court went on to reverse the court of 
appeals’ holding under the strict scrutiny analysis.127 The court also held that 
the statute was not necessarily overbroad. In its opinion, the court took a 
rare opportunity to set a standard where a scrutiny analysis trumps an 
overbreadth analysis when both doctrines are applicable to a First 
Amendment issue.128 
IV. DESCRIPTION AND HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 
STATUTES § 617.261 
                                                           
121 See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 6:4 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 
(1963)). 
122 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also Smith v. Martens, 106 P.3d 28, 37–38 (Kan. 
2005); People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 636 (Colo. 1999). 
123 Marc Rohr, Parallel Doctrinal Bars: The Unexplained Relationship Between Facial 
Overbreadth and “Scrutiny” Analysis in the Law of Freedom of Speech, 11 ELON L. REV. 
95, 109 (2019). 
124 Id. at 133–34. 
125 938 N.W.2d 74, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). 
126 Id. at 87–88. 
127 State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Minn. 2020). 
128 Id. at 645–46; see infra Part VI. 
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In 2016, Minnesota became the thirty-third state to criminalize 
the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images.129 On December 
23, 2019, the Minnesota Court of Appeals invalidated the law following their 
ruling of State v. Casillas.130 When the statute was overturned, revenge porn 
victims relied on less effective alternatives to protect themselves and to press 
charges on their perpetrators, relying instead, for example, on emergency 
harassment restraining orders or defamation charges.131 On December 30, 
2020, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the court of 
appeals’ decision.132 
Under section 617.261, it is a misdemeanor to 
intentionally disseminate an image of another person who 
is depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are 
exposed, in whole or in part, when (1) the person is 
identifiable; . . . (2) the actor knows or reasonably should 
know that the person depicted in the image does not 
consent to the dissemination; and (3) the image was 
obtained or created under circumstances in which the actor 
knew or reasonably should have known the person 
depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.133 
However, the criminal penalty will be elevated to a felony charge if the 
actor’s conduct meets any of the factors described in subdivision 2. These 
factors are: 
(1) the person depicted in the image suffers financial loss 
due to the dissemination of the image; (2) the actor 
disseminates the image with intent to profit from the 
dissemination; (3) the actor maintains an Internet website, 
                                                           
129 Sharon Yoo, A Refresher on Minnesota’s Revenge Porn Laws, KARE 11 (Oct. 29, 2019), 
kare11.com/article/news/local/breaking-the-news/katiehillsresignationbringsrevengepornto 
forefront/89-85e5b730-8f87-44fb-9bf9-9a118bc8a3cc [https://perma.cc/A9J5-66UV]. 
Authored by Minnesota House Representative John Lesch of District 66B, Lesch stated that 
he was driven to write the bill after hearing the story of Rehtaeh Parsons, a seventeen-year-
old girl who committed suicide after photos of her engaged in a sexual act with a school 
football player were shared around her high school, and the story of Timothy Turner, a 
Minnesota resident who was convicted of criminal defamation for disseminating photos of 
his ex-girlfriend and her daughter online. See State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d. 204 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2015). 
130 Yoo, supra note 129; Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 74. 
131 Briana Bierschbach, ‘Revenge Porn’ Cases Have Lawmakers Looking for a Fix, STAR 
TRIB. (Feb. 3, 2020), http://www.startribune.com/revenge-porn-cases-have-lawmakers-
looking-for-a-fix/567494832/ [https://perma.cc/F5TP-Q4FY] (writing about a woman who 
had to rely on an emergency harassment restraining order after her ex-boyfriend 
disseminated photos of her on Snapchat after the court of appeals invalidated section 
617.261); see supra Section II.A. 
132 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d. at 634. 
133 MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1 (2016). 
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online service, online application, or mobile application for 
the purpose of disseminating the image; (4) the actor posts 
the image on a website; (5) the actor disseminates the image 
with intent to harass the person depicted in the image; (6) 
the actor obtained the image by committing a violation of 
section 609.52, 609.746, 609.89, or 609.891; or (7) the 
actor has previously been convicted under this chapter.134 
V. STATE V. CASILLAS 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
In 2017, Michael Anthony Casillas was charged with felony 
nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images under section 
617.261.135 A.K.M., the victim, alleged in her complaint that she and Casillas 
were in a relationship and that when the relationship ended, Casillas used 
her account log-in information to access her wireless and television provider 
accounts.136 With access to her cellular device and its contents, he had access 
to her private sexual images and videos. Casillas then informed A.K.M. that 
he planned to distribute the content.137 A.K.M. later received a screenshot 
of a video depicting herself and another individual engaged in sexual activity, 
at which point the video had already been sent to forty-four other recipients 
and posted online.138 
In district court, Casillas moved to dismiss the charge on the basis 
that section 617.261 violated the First Amendment for being overbroad and 
vague.139 The district court rejected his motion to dismiss because his 
conduct fit within the scope of the statute in that he “intentionally 
disseminated an identifiable image of A.K.M. depicted in a sexual act.”140 
The court determined that section 617.261 regulated obscenity, which is not 
a protected speech category under the First Amendment.141 It reasoned that 
Casillas’s conduct satisfied the statute because he threatened A.K.M. that he 
                                                           
134 Id. § 617.261, subdiv. 2. 
135 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 77. 
136 Id. at 77–78. 
137 Id. at 78. 
138 Id; see City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (holding invalid a law that made it 
illegal to interrupt working police officers because it “criminalize[d] substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected speech” after defendant was convicted for shouting at the police). 
139 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 74. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subdiv. 4, the parties agreed to proceed under the 
appellant’s stipulation to the prosecution’s case to obtain review of the district court’s 
dispositive pretrial ruling, in which the district court determined that appellant was guilty of 
felony nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images because his conduct satisfied 
section 617.261’s intentional dissemination requirement. 
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was going to post her image online, demonstrating that he knew A.K.M. 
would not consent to the dissemination.142 
The court also found that the State proved “the image was 
obtained under circumstances in which [Casillas] knew or reasonably 
should have known [that A.K.M.] had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”143 It reasoned that A.K.M.’s expectation of privacy was “implicitly 
inherent” because of (1) the sexual nature of the act depicted, (2) Casillas’s 
demonstration of awareness that A.K.M. would not consent to the 
dissemination, and (3) that Casillas knew, or reasonably should have known, 
that A.K.M. had a reasonable expectation of privacy.144 The district court 
convicted Casillas of felony nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual 
images, denied his motion for a downward dispositional sentencing 
departure, and ordered him to serve twenty-three months in prison.145 
Casillas appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 
B. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Overbreadth Analysis 
On appeal, Casillas argued to the court of appeals that the district 
court erred in its ruling and that section 617.261 was unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague and thus facially invalid under the First Amendment.146 
The court evaluated the statute’s First Amendment issue under the 
overbreadth doctrine by determining the following elements: (1) whether 
the statute had a broad sweep;147 (2) if its sweep was limited to expressive 
conduct proscribed by the First Amendment;148 (3) if it prohibited conduct 
beyond its legitimate sweep;149 (4) if it violated the First Amendment by 
prohibiting a substantial amount of protected speech;150 and (5) if it could be 
saved by narrowing or severing certain words, phrases, or provisions.151 
With regard to the breadth of section 617.261, the court 
conducted a de novo review of the statute’s constitutionality.152 The court 
began with a general description of the First Amendment and its 
                                                           





147 Id. at 77. 
148 Id. at 79. 
149 Id. at 81. 
150 Id. at 84. 
151 Id. at 86. 
152 Id. at 78 (citing Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Minn. 2014)). An appellate 
court must review a lower court’s determination of the constitutionality of a statute under de 
novo review. Statutes that allegedly restrict the First Amendment rights are not presumed to 
be constitutional. See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), review 
denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006). 
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constitutional powers.153 In evaluating Casillas’s argument that section 
617.261 was facially overbroad, the court presented the ways one would 
bring forth an overbreadth challenge: first, “a challenger must establish that 
no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged statute would be 
valid or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.”154 Second, “a law 
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.’”155 The latter option here allows for any litigant, such as Casillas, to 
contest the statute via a facial overbreadth challenge in a “prophylactic” 
effort to invalidate it as a means to reverse a conviction,156 even when the 
statute may be applied constitutionally to that litigant’s set of 
circumstances.157 
 The court applied the four-step analytical framework established 
by the United States Supreme Court to evaluate the overbreadth 
challenge.158 First, the court must construe, or interpret, the challenged 
statute to determine its scope and sweep.159 Second, upon understanding 
what the statute actually covers, the court must determine whether the 
statute is limited to unprotected categories of speech or expressive 
conduct.160 If the statute is not limited to unprotected speech or expressive 
conduct, then the court moves to steps three and four, as follows. Third, the 
court must determine if the statute proscribes a “substantial proportion” of 
protected speech compared to the unprotected speech.161 This does not 
                                                           
153 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 79 (“The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.’ It applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The First Amendment establishes that the government generally may not 
restrict expression because of its messages, ideas, subject matter, or content. The First 
Amendment’s protections extend beyond expressions regarding matters of public concern, 
and ‘First Amendment principles apply with equal force to speech or expressive conduct on 
the Internet.’ ‘The [Supreme] Court has applied similarly conceived First Amendment 
standards to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in books.’”) (citations omitted). 
154 Id. at 79 (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)). 
155 Id. (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473). With regard to the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court has applied this method of invalidating a law if a substantial number of its applications 
are unconstitutional when judged against the law’s plainly legitimate sweep as an exception 
to the ordinary rules of standing. The exception was created out of fear that the traditional 
rules of standing could cause a “chilling effect” on speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 
U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
156 Fallon, supra note 98, at 867–71; Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581–82 (1989); 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768–69 (1982). 
157 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 80. 
158 Id. at 79 (applying In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 847 (Minn. 2019)). 
159 Id. at 80. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (stating that the inquiry is “whether the protected speech and expressive conduct make 
up a substantial proportion of the behavior the statute prohibits compared with conduct and 
21
Yang: Minnesota Revenge Porn Law: A Look at the State v. Casillas Decis
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2021
2021] MINNESOTA REVENGE PORN LAW 1237 
mean that the statute may not proscribe some protected speech—“a statute 
is not substantially overbroad merely because one can conceive of some 
impermissible applications.”162 Fourth, if a substantial portion of protected 
speech is conscribed, the court must determine whether it may narrow the 
statute or sever language to cure it.163 If the court is unable to cure the statute 
by narrowing its construction or severing language, the court must turn to 
the last resort option, which is to invalidate the statute entirely.164 
With regard to the first step, the court found that the statute’s 
sweep was overly broad. The court stated that the statute’s requirements 
were predicated on a broad negligence mens rea;165 the statute’s language 
stated that “the disseminator ‘knows or reasonably should know that the 
person depicted in the image does not consent to the dissemination’ and 
‘the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the actor 
knew or reasonably should have known the person depicted had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.’”166 The court also reasoned that the 
statute lacks “harm-causing” and “intent-to-harm” elements except when 
elevating the disseminator’s conduct from a misdemeanor charge to a felony 
conviction.167 The lack of intent to harm failed to limit the statute’s scope as 
to what expressive conduct would be criminalized.168  
 With regard to the second step, the court found that the statute’s 
sweep was not limited to unprotected speech.169 Such unprotected speech, 
or exceptions to the First Amendment, include: “speech or expressive 
conduct designed to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, 
speech integral to criminal conduct, so-called fighting words, child 
pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and 
                                                           
speech that are unprotected and may be legitimately criminalized.”) (citing A.J.B., 929 
N.W.2d at 847–48). 
162 Id. (quoting A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847–48). 
163 Id. (referencing A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848). 
164 Id. (summarizing A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848). 
165 Id. at 81. 
166 Id. at 81–82; see A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 850 (stating that the “‘knows or has reason to 
know’ standard—a negligence mens rea—means a person may be convicted under [a statute 
that criminalizes stalking] even though the person does not intend or even know that his 
communication would frighten, threaten, oppress, persecute, or intimidate the victim.”). 
167 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 82; MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 2(b)(1), (5) (2016) (stating 
that the penalties are heightened if, among other conduct, the actor “disseminates the image 
with intent to harass the person depicted in the image”) (emphasis added). 
168 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 82. 
169 Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has long permitted some content-based restrictions in a few 
limited areas, in which speech is of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from it is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”) 
(citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19 (Minn. 2014)). 
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imminent threat the government has the power to prevent.”170 The State 
raised its arguments on reliance of this definition of obscenity;171 but the 
court found that this argument misconstrued the application of “patently 
offensive.”172 The measure of obscenity is the content of the work and not 
the dissemination of it.173 Therefore, the court found that section 617.261 
would incorrectly subject all images that fall within its regulation as “patently 
offensive” even when the contents of the images were not actually “patently 
offensive.”174 
The State also raised the argument that section 617.261 offers not a First 
Amendment issue but a privacy matter.175 However, privacy was not a 
recognized form of unprotected speech, and the Supreme Court itself has 
had a history of reluctance towards expanding the “delineated categories.”176 
Because the court determined that Section 617.26 had a broad 
sweep and a reach that was not limited to the unprotected categories of 
speech under the First Amendment, the court proceeded to the third and 
fourth steps.177 With regard to the third step, the court analyzed whether 
section 617.261 proscribed a substantial amount of constitutionally-
protected speech compared to the unprotected speech the statute could 
legitimately prohibit.178 It raised attention to circumstances that depict 
                                                           
170 Id.; A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 846 (“First Amendment protections are not limitless. There is 
a point where First Amendment protections end and government regulation of speech or 
expressive conduct becomes permissible. Exceptions to First Amendment protections 
generally fall into several delineated categories that include speech or expressive conduct . . 
. .”) (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)); see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 
722 (“[T]he Court has acknowledged that perhaps there exist ‘some categories of speech that 
have been historically unprotected . . . but have not yet been specifically identified or 
discussed . . . in our case law.’ Before exempting a category of speech from the normal 
prohibition on content-based restrictions, however, the Court must be presented with 
‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore 
unrecognized) tradition of proscription.’”). 
171 See Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 83. The State argued that “[t]he average person would find 
that [section 617.261] regulates content that appeals to the prurient interest,” and “people 
who disseminate nonconsensual, private sexual images” have a prurient interest in sex. Id. 
Furthermore, disseminating nonconsensual sexual images is “patently offensive,” and 
thereby barred under section 617.261 for “lack[ing] serious literary, artistic, political, and 
scientific value.” Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 83–84. 
176 See In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019); United States v. Stevens, 
559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“We in no sense 
suggest that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of 
expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit 
and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”). 
177 See Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 84–88. 
178 Id. at 88–90. 
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people engaged in sexual acts in which those people also consent to the 
dissemination of the photos.179 The court argued that in such instances, 
[t]he statute does not define or explain the circumstances 
that should cause someone who observes an image 
described . . . to reasonably know that the person depicted 
in the image did not consent to its dissemination or that the 
image was obtained or created under circumstances in 
which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.180 
This lack of clarity creates room for a subjective interpretation of the statute 
in which “reasonable people could reach different conclusions” of images 
and of the ways such images were obtained.181 Thus, the court found that 
section 617.261 proscribed a substantial amount of constitutionally-
protected speech because there could be a substantial number of instances 
in which innocent people could easily be prosecuted for disseminating 
images that they received without knowledge that the depicted person 
lacked consent, without knowledge that the image was obtained or created 
under circumstances in which the person would have had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and without intent to cause harm.182 
The court also found that section 617.261’s reach was substantial 
enough to have a chilling effect on speech.183 For example, as the court 
noted, under the statute, someone with access to a public platform that views 
an image of another engaged in a sexual act, or whose intimate parts were 
exposed, could be at risk if they disseminate the content further. She or he 
could be criminally liable “based on a prosecutor’s subjective belief that the 
image’s content should have caused the observer to know that the person 
depicted did not consent to the dissemination and that the image was 
obtained or created under circumstances indicating that the person depicted 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy.”184 
                                                           
179 Id. at 88 (referencing various political acts where citizens publicly advocate for a cause, 
such as the Free the Nipple campaign). 
180 Id. at 89 (stating that the district court’s reasoning that A.K.M. had an expectation to keep 
her images private was “implicitly inherent from the nature of the act depicted” suggests that 
the court recognizes the statute could be subject to one’s own subjectivity). 
181 Id.  
182 Id. 
183 Id. This exception was created out of fear that the traditional rules of standing could cause 
a “chilling effect” on speech. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Chilling 
Effect, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “chilling effect” as “[t]he result 
of a law or practice that seriously discourages the exercise of a constitutional right, such as 
the right to appeal or the right of free speech.”); see also State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 
170 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the “key concern of the overbreadth doctrine” was to deter 
the chilling effect on protected speech). 
184 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 89. 
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With regard to the fourth step, the court determined that it was 
impossible to cure section 617.261 by narrowly construing it or by severing 
language.185 Curing the statute was not within the court’s powers because to 
do so would require the court to rewrite it.186 Even in the instance that the 
court were to construe the statute per the State’s request, a conflict would 
arise as to whether the criminal penalty constitutes a misdemeanor or felony 
charge.187 Furthermore, the court would not be able to construe or sever the 
penalties without adding new language.188 Because the court found that it was 
unable to cure the statute, the court invalidated the statute altogether.189  
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
 The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis of Casillas by 
determining whether the statute restricted protected speech.190 If the statute 
proscribed only unprotected speech, the respondent’s overbreadth 
challenge would fail.191 The court refused to recognize “substantial invasions 
of privacy” as a new category of unprotected speech because the State failed 
to present sufficient evidence that the category was a part of “a long (if 
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”192 The court also 
rejected the State’s arguments that the statute applied only to unprotected 
categories of speech: indecent speech, speech integral to criminal conduct, 
and child pornography.193 Instead, the court held that the statute covered 
some protected speech.194 
 The court concluded that it was not necessary to determine 
whether the statute was content-neutral (which requires intermediate 
scrutiny) or content-based (which requires strict scrutiny) because it found 
that the State “met its burden under the more searching strict scrutiny 
analysis.”195 It found that the State had a compelling interest to “safeguard its 
                                                           
185 Id. at 86. 
186 Id. at 90. 
187 Id. at 85. MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 2(a) states “whoever violates subdivision 1 is 
guilty of a gross misdemeanor,” but subdivision 2(b)(5) states that the person is guilty of a 
felony if “the actor disseminates the image with intent to harass . . . .” 
188 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 90. The Supreme Court has held that rewriting a statute exceeds 
the bounds of judicial power. See U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). Furthermore, 
adding statutory language by judicial fiat could deviate starkly from the legislature’s intent. 
See Hensel, 901 N.W.2d at 180. 
189 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 86. Invalidating a statute is only permissible as a last resort. See 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
292 (2008); State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 533 (Minn. 2016). 
190 State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 637 (Minn. 2020). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. (quoting Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011)). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 641. 
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citizens’ health and safety” by “criminalizing the nonconsensual 
dissemination of private sexual images” because of the severe suffering 
revenge porn victims endure.196 The court also found that the State 
successfully showed that the statute satisfied the “narrowly tailored” prong 
as a “least restrictive means” for several reasons.197 
First, “the Legislature explicitly defined the type of” proscribed 
image as one that is “of another person who is depicted in a sexual act or 
whose intimate parts are exposed,” to which “sexual act,” “intimate parts,” 
and “image” were all defined.198 Second, the statute only applies to 
intentional dissemination of the image.199 The defendant must “knowingly 
and voluntarily disseminate” the image.200 Dissemination committed with 
“negligent, accidental, or even reckless” mens rea does not fall within the 
statute.201 Third, the statute has several exceptions that further narrow its 
scope.202 Fourth, the statute requires the defendant to have acted without 
consent.203 Lastly, the statute only covers private speech, to which “‘[s]peech 
on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern’ 
than speech on public matters that go to the heart of our democratic 
system.”204 Here, the court distinguishes Casillas from In re Welfare of 
A.J.B.205 and State v. Jorgenson206 in that section 617.261 only covers “private 
sexual images,” not speech that is “at the core of protected First 
Amendment speech.”207 
Finding that the means were narrowly tailored, the court moved on 
to address the overbreadth doctrine. It clarified for the first time when to 
apply strict scrutiny instead of an overbreadth challenge: “When a statute is 
challenged on both scrutiny and overbreadth grounds, a scrutiny analysis 
                                                           
196 Id. (recognizing the detrimental effects that nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual 
images has on a victim’s mental and emotional wellbeing, including minors, by citing several 
statistics). 
197 Id. at 643. 
198 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1) (internal quotations omitted).  
199 Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 1). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. The court lists several exemptions recognized within MINN. STAT. § 617.261, subdiv. 
5. These include instances where prosecution may need to disseminate the image; when the 
images need to be distributed for medical or mental health treatment; when the images are 
“obtained in a commercial setting”; when journalists use the images in matters of public 
interest; and when educators and scientists use private sexual images for “legitimate scientific 
research or educational purposes.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 644 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)). 
205 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (2019). 
206 946 N.W.2d 596, 605 (2020). 
207 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629 (citing In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 853 (Minn. 
2019)). 
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should be conducted first. This approach is best because a statute that 
survives a scrutiny analysis will necessarily survive the overbreadth 
challenge.208 The overbreadth analysis would be “needlessly redundant.”209 
In conclusion of its analysis, the court reversed and remanded the case, 
thereby reinstating section 617.261.210 
VI. A LOOK AT THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S 
STRICT SCRUTINY LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The court’s strict scrutiny analysis of section 617.261 was 
incomplete because it did not determine whether the government showed 
that section 617.261 was the least restrictive means to address revenge 
porn.211 Notably, the analysis began by setting out that the statute must be 
“narrowly tailored” with “the least restrictive means,” but it then ends with 
“the restriction is justified by a compelling government interest and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest,” never delving into the whether there 
are less restrictive means.212 Yet, a look at precedent reveals that strict 
scrutiny analyses have traditionally required an examination of this latter 
element. For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that the statute at issue failed strict scrutiny 
because the government failed to meet the least-restrictive-means element.213 
The Court emphasized that “[n]o one disputes that [the statute] is narrowly 
tailored . . . .”214 Yet, “[i]t was for the Government, presented with a 
plausible, less restrictive alternative, to prove the alternative to be ineffective, 
and [the statute] to be the least restrictive available means.”215 
This issue was indeed presented to the court. In Casillas, the respondent 
argued that a less restrictive alternative existed: civil remedies.216 The State 
goes on to reject this alternative on the grounds that civil remedies are 
insufficient because they minimize the seriousness of nonconsensual 
pornography and many victims are financially unable to pursue civil cases 
against their perpetrators.217 Yet, the court here does not weigh in on this 
issue at all within its analysis. 
                                                           
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 646–47. 
211 See id. 
212 Id. at 640, 644 (internal citations omitted). 
213 United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  
214 Id. at 804. 
215 Id. at 812–13. 
216 Brief for Respondent at 45–46, State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2020) (No. A19-
0576). 
217 Brief for Appellant at 49, State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. 2020) (No. A19-0576); 
see also supra Section II.A. 
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Had the court completed its strict scrutiny analysis, it may have 
likely rejected the respondent’s argument that civil remedies were the least 
restrictive means because of the inequitable systemic barriers that prevent 
most victims from pursuing such a route.218 The court’s acknowledgments 
of victim suffering, the complexities in the identification of posters, and the 
immunity provided to internet providers seem to suggest that the court 
would have found that no less restrictive means did in fact exist. 
Interestingly, the question as to the court’s failure, whether by choice or 
neglect, to complete their strict scrutiny analysis would have likely served as 
additional grounds for a valid appeal to the Supreme Court, as the case itself 
meets the Supreme Court’s minimal standards of consideration in that the 
case’s central issue arises under the First Amendment and that there are 
conflicting decisions on the matter in a number of state courts of last 
resort.219 
VII. ASSESSING THE LANGUAGE OF THE TWO OPINIONS 
The difference between the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s approaches to victims’ experiences is striking. 
It is immediately apparent from reading both opinions that the court of 
appeals’ analysis was formalistic in nature,220 whereas the supreme court 
applied a much more functional analysis.221 The court of appeals’ decision 
mentioned little to nothing of the effects that nonconsensual dissemination 
of sexual content has on victims. The court mentions that in today’s “age of 
expansive internet communication, images may be disseminated, received, 
and observed with ease.”222 Yet, the court provides no contextual framework 
as to how today’s “age of expansive internet communication” has actually 
resulted in the creation and the gross prevalence of revenge porn. Instead, 
                                                           
218 Supra Section II.A. 
219 See SUP. CT. R. 10. The Court has broad discretion in its power to grant writs of certiorari. 
Id. Two factors that the Court may use to determine whether it grant such a petition include, 
but are not limited to, whether “a state court of last resort has decided an important federal 
question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a 
United States court of appeals” and whether “a state court or a United States court of appeals 
has decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court . . . .” Id. It would seem that revenge porn cases argued under free speech 
violations would fit the Court’s considerations, but because the Court grants so few petitions 
a year, the likelihood of hearing such a case remains low. 
220 State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that the court is 
“constitutionally obligated to faithfully apply the law,” despite the harmful effects 
disseminating nonconsensual private sexual images cause). 
221 State v. Casillas, 952 N.W.2d 629, 646 (Minn. 2020) (noting that in addition to the legal 
analysis, the court must balance the government’s goal of protecting Minnesotans from the 
harmful nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images with the protection of free 
speech). 
222 Casillas, 938 N.W.2d at 88. 
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the court only goes so far as to discuss an individual’s consensual sharing of 
his or her own content.223 Furthermore, there is no mention of the 
amplification effect or the like, and A.K.M.’s suffering is merely discussed 
as factual background information.224 In so doing, the court of appeals’ 
opinion is one that fits quite squarely into feminist scholars’ criticisms as 
previously discussed225: the court’s judicial language is plagued with a shadow 
taxonomy that ultimately trivialized and minimized victims’ experiences, 
hindering the administration of full justice. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court presents a rather policy-driven 
opinion and evaluates revenge porn with a much more critical analysis.226 Its 
functional approach was heavily steeped in research about victims’ realities. 
For example, the court discussed how revenge porn stripped victims of their 
agency and exposed their “most intimate moments to others against [their] 
will.”227 It discussed how the content can be shared with the victim’s “friends, 
family, bosses, co-workers, teachers, fellow students, or random strangers 
on the internet,” emphasizing that “[t]he effects of revenge porn are so 
profound that victims have psychological profiles that match sexual assault 
survivors,” to which some victims resort to suicide.228 It even touches on the 
amplification effect in its acknowledgment of the various number of online 
websites that can host the content, stating that “[an estimate of ten thousand] 
websites feature revenge porn, and social media platforms, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat, allow for explicit content to spread 
rapidly.”229 Although strict scrutiny analyses are very rigid and hard to 
overcome, this method may allow courts to critically evaluate the humanity 
that drives laws into action. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
                                                           
223 Id. 
224 See id. at 77–78. 
225 See supra Section II.A. 
226 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629 (discussing in detail the research regarding the dangers of 
revenge porn in both Parts III and IV). 
227 Id. (citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998)). 
228 Id. (citing Samantha Bates, Revenge Porn and Mental Health: A Qualitative Analysis of 
the Mental Health Effects of Revenge Porn on Female Survivors, 12 FEMINIST 
CRIMINOLOGY 3 (2016)) (arguing that the effects of revenge porn are so profound that victims 
have psychological profiles that match sexual assault survivors); see Sophia Ankel, Many 
Revenge Porn Victims Consider Suicide—Why Aren’t Schools Doing More to Stop it?, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/may/07/many-
revenge-porn-victims-consider-suicide-why-arent-schools-doing-more-to-stop-it 
[https://perma.cc/YY2G-P6RX] (“Tragically, not every victim survives this experience and 
some commit suicide as a result of their exposure online.”). 
229 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 629. 
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The concept of revenge porn is not new. The practice of using 
sexuality against a person as a means to oppress, objectify, and humiliate has 
always been prevalent in our society.230 Yet, revenge porn statutes themselves 
are fairly new.231 These statutes raise tough questions about the First 
Amendment and blur the line between legislative intent and freedom of 
expression. 
Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in State v. 
Casillas, section 617.261 was reinstated.232 Although it appears that Casillas 
did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,233 any revenge 
porn case argued under the First Amendment would likely present to the 
Court the opportunity to set a judicial standard as to when and whether a 
strict scrutiny analysis precludes the overbreadth doctrine. Most 
importantly, with such a case, the Court would provide wider protection to 
victims and set judicial parameters that state legislatures may apply for more 
effective revenge porn statutes. Yet, our constitutional treasure that is the 
First Amendment is profound, and it is protected, and the Court will not 
merely hear a case for the sake of public interest.234  
To best tackle revenge porn, we need to “deconstruct societal 
conceptions about who is worthy of being believed.”235 Unlike rape cases, 
where societal stereotypes around virginity lead to the artificial construction 
of an “ideal victim” based on factors such as the victim’s race, age, 
relationship to the perpetrator, activity at the time of the offense, use of 
drugs or alcohol, and criminal history, no such construct exists in revenge 
porn cases.236 Without an “ideal” victim, society and state actors such as law 
                                                           
230 See, e.g., Clare McGlynn, Erika Rackley & Ruth Houghton, Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: The 
Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse, FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25, 27–29 (2017) 
(examining the “continuum of sexual violence” developed by Liz Kelly and using it as a 
framework to analyze revenge porn). 
231 Tal Kopan, States Criminalize ‘Revenge Porn’, POLITICO (2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/states-criminalize-revenge-porn-099082 
[https://perma.cc/JT9H-DDRD] (describing how New Jersey was the first state to enact a 
revenge porn statute, which was passed in 2004).  
232 Casillas, 952 N.W.2d at 646–47. 
233 Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding on December 30, 2020, the defendant 
had ninety days to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. See SUP. CT. R. 13. (stating 
that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a judgment 
in any case . . . is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within [ninety] days after 
entry of the judgment.”). A search of the United States Supreme Court’s docket yields no 
history of the case nor that such a petition was ever filed, although it is possible that such a 
petition is pending. 
234 See SUP. CT. R. 10. 
235 Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 431. 
236 Id. at 421 (arguing that “ideal victim theory is a framework for discussing how believability 
politics arise in the context of victimhood”).  
[T]he ideal victim is  
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enforcement and prosecutors often blame revenge porn victims for taking 
sexual images or videos of themselves.237 Furthermore, the socioeconomic 
and racial backgrounds of victims often determine victims’ status. “In 
addition to the inherent tension between the idea of virginal purity and 
revenge porn, marginalized groups experience additional barriers to being 
perceived as innocent victims.”238 Minority victims are seen as less innocent 
and less pure, and thus they face more barriers in convincing state actors, 
the media, and society to recognize and address their victimhood.239 For 
example, 
[t]he hypersexualization of black women’s bodies is a 
systemic stereotype that is reflected in “society’s attribution 
of sex as part of the ‘natural’ role of Black women and 
girls.” These stereotypes inform how Black women and 
girls are perceived today, as “these stereotypes underlie the 
implicit bias that shapes many adults’ views of Black 
females as sexually promiscuous, hedonistic, and in need 
of socialization.”240 
Until Congress successfully enacts a federal law or revises section 
230 of the CDA, revenge porn victims of all genders and races will have to 
put their trust in state legislatures to craft effective laws, even though such 
laws may be found unconstitutional. By simply having a law in place, states 
validate the humiliation, trauma, and violations suffered by victims through 
the statute’s categorical identifications of revenge porn as a definitive crime 
and the subsequent punitive damages available against perpetrators. 
Furthermore, it validates the significance of victims’ experiences to the 
police, who, as the first state actors that push a case towards prosecution, 
very often resort to blaming the victim, refusing to obtain search warrants 
against perpetrators, and disregarding the perpetrator’s acts altogether.241 
                                                           
1. “weak,” which can be someone who is “sick, old, or very young,” or . 
. . innocent; 2. “carrying out a respectable project” when victimized;  
3. present somewhere that the victim could not be blamed for being;  
4. victimized by an offender who is “big and bad”;  
5. victimized by an offender who is unknown to the victim and has no 
personal relationship to the victim; and  
6. powerful enough to make their case known. 
Id. at 422 (internal citations omitted). 
237 Id. at 432 (stating “‘the ideal rape victim’” is a virgin, and the “‘perfect virgin’” is someone 
who is “‘young, good-looking, straight, and white.’”) (citations omitted).  
238 Id.  
239 Id. (stating a study conducted by Georgetown Law’s Center on Poverty and Inequality 
which found that “black girls are perceived as less innocent than white girls.”). 
240 Id. at 423 (internal citations omitted). 
241 Citron & Franks, supra note 14, at 367 (stating “[v]ictims are often told that the behavior 
is not serious enough for an in-depth investigation. ‘They are shooed away because, officers 
say, they are to blame for the whole mess, since they chose to share their intimate pictures[]’” 
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“The normalization of victim blaming not only affects public perception of 
victims but also police’s willingness to assist victims. . . . The mere act of 
having taken a naked picture delegitimizes victimhood status in the eyes of 
police officers.”242 Thus, although the availability of a law does not guarantee 
that police will treat revenge porn victims with respect and urgency, at the 
very least, (1) a law legitimizes the criminal nature of revenge porn and better 
equips police to recognize and investigate the facts preceding prosecution, 
and (2) it simultaneously provides victims relief that the State will have a 
legally cognizable claim against their perpetrator.243 
In the age of the #MeToo movement, we must give voice to victims, 
not silence them. Adequately addressing revenge porn forces police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries to shift away from victim blaming to a more 
proper, and equitable, recognition of victimhood in and outside of revenge 
porn cases. These actors must come to detach virginal attributes, such as 
chastity and purity, apart from victim realities.244 Courts must additionally 
consider the actual harms suffered by victims, such as the amplification 
effect of victims’ photos across the web, in their legal analyses and not 
merely within the background information.245 Such facts should equate to 
more than a contextual fact or a footnote. Congress must reform section 
230 of the CDA to dispel the immunity provided to companies that 
perpetuate the worldwide exposure of non-consensually disseminated 
sexual content. And finally, state legislatures must think forwardly as to what 
First Amendment challenges will inevitably come to confront prospective 
revenge porn laws in order to best construct the statutes to withstand judicial 
scrutiny. 
                                                           
and police failed to obtain a warrant or search a defendant’s computer or home due to 
disregard of the victim’s experience). 
242 Kinlaw, supra note 1, at 434–35. 
243 Id. at 427–28. 
244 See Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A 
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 148–49 (2001) (“At all 
stages of prosecution, they argued, police, prosecutors, judges, and juries relied on rape 
myths to discount the possibility that a rape had occurred. Such myths included . . . that only 
‘bad’ women are raped, and that women provoke rape through their appearance and 
behavior.”) (citations omitted). 
245 Vora, supra note 2, at 246. 
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